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A NECESSARY COMPROMISE: THE RIGHT TO FOREGO
ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND HYDRATION UNDER
MARYLAND'S LIFE-SUSTAINING
PROCEDURES ACT
When confronted with the sight of a permanently unconscious
patient, kept alive only by a maze of feeding tubes and respirators,
many of us shudder. We certainly would not want to be sustained in
this manner. Wishing to spare our family and friends from an unnecessarily protracted period of uncertainty and grief, we write a
living will, directing in advance that all artificial life-sustaining treatment be discontinued should we become incapacitated and unable
to give consent. We may be unaware, however, that despite our
foresight, the law may prohibit health care providers from fully implementing our wishes. Like the patient who never wrote a living
will, we may be sustained indefinitely by tubal feeding and
hydration.
Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted
living will legislation.' Living will statutes, also known as natural
death acts, 2 enable competent adults to prepare in advance for their
care should they become terminally ill and unable to make their
wishes known.3 The past three years have been a particularly prolific period for such legislation. Sixteen new natural death acts were
developed within a sixteen-month period between 1985 and 1986.'
In part, this legislative activity reflects an increased societal awareness of the advances medical technology has made in prolonging
life. As recognized in the preamble to the Maryland Life-Sustaining

1. Areen, The Legal Status of Consent Obtained From Families of Adult Patients to Withhold
or Withdraw Treatment, 258J. A.M.A. 229, 230 (1987).
2. The first such statute, enacted in 1976 in California, was entitled a "Natural
Death Act." The term is now used generically to refer to other living will statutes. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,

DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT

141

(1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSIONI.
3. The legislation may provide for two types of advance directives. A living will is
an instructional directive, enabling an individual to assert in writing his or her wishes for
medical treatment. A proxy directive is the appointment by an individual of a surrogate
to make medical decisions should he or she become incompetent. The two forms may
be used together. For example, a durable power of attorney (a form of proxy directive)
may incorporate extensive personal instructions. Id. at 136, 139.
4. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING VILL LAws 5 (1987) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. The other 23 statutes were enacted between 1976 and 1984. Id.
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Procedures Act, 5 "the application of some [modem technological]
procedures to an individual suffering a difficult and uncomfortable
process of dying may cause loss of patient dignity and secure only
continuation of a precarious and burdensome prolongation of
life." 6
In addition, an increasing number of deaths are occurring in
institutional settings in which control of the patient's care lies with
health care professionals.7 Natural death acts are intended to validate the legal status of livifig wills in such a setting.' According to
the Maryland legislature, prior to the Life-Sustaining Procedures
Act, "an individual may have [had] difficulty exercising the right to
control decisions relating to life-extending procedures because of
uncertainty in the medical profession concerning the legality of application or withholding of such procedures even where a competent patient has evidenced a desire that these procedures be applied
or withheld."' Educational and professional groups encouraged the
preparation of advance directives even before the enactment of natural death legislation.' 0 Physicians, however, expressed concern
l1
over their potential liability for following a patient's instructions.
Despite their intended purpose, legislative enactments
designed to validate living wills may result in a contraction of rights
for those who act under the statutes. This comment will examine
one possible limitation on patient rights: the prohibition in a
number of living will statutes against requesting that artificial nutrition and hydration (AN&H) be withdrawn or withheld.' 2 First, this
5. Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, ch. 620, 1985 Md. Laws 2944 (codified as

amended at MD.

HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.

§§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1987)).

6. Id. at 2945.
7. As of 1983, 80% of deaths in the United States occurred in hospitals or longterm care institutions. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 17-18.
8. Id. at 141.
9. Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, ch. 620, 1985 Md. Laws 2944.
10. The Society for the Right to Die, the Euthanasia Education Council, the American Protestant Hospital Association, the American Catholic Hospital Association, and
the American Public Health Association each have promulgated living wills. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 139-40 & n.51.
11. See Life Sustaining Procedures Act, ch. 620, 1985 Md. Laws 2944. In fact, there
has been only one reported criminal prosecution of a physician for withdrawing treatment from an irreversibly comatose patient. In that case a California appellate court
ruled that the physician's actions in disconnecting a respirator and intravenous tubes, in
accordance with family requests, were not criminal. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal.
App. 3d 1006, 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (1983). The court, in response to writs of
prohibition filed by the doctors, vacated the charges of murder and conspiracy to murder pending before a magistrate. Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
12. Artificial nutrition and hydration (AN&H) is the provision of food and fluids to
patients through intravenous lines or tubes inserted into the gastrointestinal tract. See
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comment will discuss the nature of AN&H as a form of medical
treatment and argue that AN&H should not be distinguished from
other forms of life-sustaining procedures. This comment next will
examine case law in jurisdictions both with and without living will
legislation. The case law indicates that individuals possess constitutional and common-law rights, which cannot be overridden by statute, to terminate any medical treatment. Third, this comment
examines the legislative scheme in Maryland, where the natural
death statute prohibits the withdrawal or withholding of food and
water. 3 Finally, this comment suggests approaches which the Maryland legislature and the judiciary should consider to assure that the
intent of the Life-Sustaining Procedures Act will be honored in the
future.
I.

THE NATURE OF

AN&H-As

MEDICAL TREATMENT

Since the New Jersey Supreme Court decided In re Quinlan, 4
the issue of removing a respirator from an irreversibly comatose patient with family consent, with or without the prior direction of the
patient, has not stirred much controversy.' 5 Nevertheless, of the
thirty-nine natural death statutes, twenty-four make some reference
to the withholding or withdrawal of AN&H.' 6 Thirteen states, including Maryland, associate this treatment with comfort care,' 7 the
termination of which statutes generally forbid.'" Statutes in seven
generally Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always Be Given Food and Water?, 13 HASTINGS
CE.rER REP. 17 (Oct. 1983). For a more detailed discussion of the means of providing
AN&H, see infra text accompanying notes 47-51.
Due to technological advances in recent decades, AN&H is now a commonplace
means of sustaining dying patients who would otherwise be unable to feed themselves.
Lynn & Childress, supra. Although medicine also may be delivered through tubes and
lines, this comment addresses only the administration, withdrawal, or withholding of
AN&H.
13. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-605 (Supp. 1987).
14. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976), overruled in part, In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). In Quinlan, a
landmark decision, the NewJersey Supreme Court held that the parent and guardian of
a patient in a persistent vegetative state could authorize discontinuance of a mechanical
respirator. Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671.
15. See generally Steinbo'ck, The Removal of Mr. Herbert's Feeding Tube, 13 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 13 (Oct. 1983) (physicians are protected from civil and criminal liability).
16. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 6.
17. Traditionally comfort care includes providing proper positioning, skin care, oral
hygiene, and pain-reducing medication. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 5051.
18. The thirteen states are Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 6.
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states prohibit termination of AN&H.' 9 Four statutes indicate that
AN&H not needed for comfort care may be withheld or
withdrawn.

20

It is unclear how these statutory prohibitions interact with common-law and constitutional rights. Courts in a number of jurisdictions have indicated that there may be constitutional and commonlaw rights to the termination of any treatment. Relying upon this
case law, groups distributing sample living wills encourage people
to include their wishes with regard to tubal sustenance, despite possible conflicts with legislation. 2 1 At the other extreme, some nursing homes view the prohibition as a declaration of state intent which
they believe may mandate force-feeding even competent patients to
whom the living will statutes do not otherwise apply. 2
The withdrawal or withholding of AN&H is problematic for a
number of reasons. 23 Because all living things require food and
water to survive, it is difficult to regard termination of nutrients as
merely allowing natural causes to operate. 24 The removal of a respi25
rator is not always fatal, whereas the termination of AN&H is.
19. The seven states are Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Maine, Missouri,
and Wisconsin. Id. at 7.
20. The four states are Alaska, Arkansas, Montana, and Tennessee. Id. Nearly all of
the statutes restricting the termination of AN&H were enacted after 1983. Horan, Termination of Medical Treatment: Imminent Legislative Issues, 31 CATH. LAw. 106, 107 (1987).
Only two of the sixteen statutes enacted prior to 1983 expressly exclude nutrition and
hydration. Id.
21. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 7.
22. Interview with Ellen A. Callegary, Principal Counsel, Maryland Office of the Attorney General, in Baltimore, Maryland (Oct. 15, 1987). In Maryland, the Life-Sustaining Procedures Act limits the implementation of a living will to a small class of
patients. A "qualified patient" under the Act must be diagnosed within a reasonable
degree of medical certainty to be in a terminal condition from which, despite application
of life-sustaining procedures, death is imminent and there can be no recovery. Thus, on
its face the provisions and limitations of the Act do not apply to competent patients for
whom death is not imminent. MD. HE.ALT-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-601 (f) to -6 01(g) (Supp.
1987). The living will takes effect when a patient no longer is able to give directions
regarding health care procedures. Id. § 5-602(c)(1).
23. For the purpose of this comment, withdrawing and withholding treatment will be
equated. It should be noted, however, that historically authorities have differentiated
between the failure to initiate treatment and discontinuation of treatment already in
place. PRESIDEWr's COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 73-77. Determining whether the former is indeed ethically more permissible than the latter is beyond the scope of this
comment.
24. Steinbock, supra note 15, at 14. So-called "active" euthanasia, intentionally hastening death by positive action, is considered morally and ethically impermissible. Living wills contemplate passive euthanasia, a hastening of death by natural process by
failing to take positive action. Dufraine, Living JVills-A Need for Statewide Legislation or a
Federally Recognized Right, 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 781, 784.
25. For example, Karen Quinlan survived a decade after removal of her respirator.
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Some experts believe that death from termination of AN&H is particularly painful. 26 .For all of these reasons, many authorities consider administration of AN&H necessary to a patient's basic comfort
27
and dignity.
In addition to these biological factors, an array of emotional responses make AN&H different from other forms of medical treatment. Society, almost universally, regards the providing of food and
water as an expression of care and compassion. Even those who
would allow termination of AN&H acknowledge this psychological
connection between food and love and between nutritional and
emotional satisfaction.28 It may be particularly difficult for adult
children to agree to withdraw such treatment from their parents,
who were their childhood nurturers.
At least one authority cites deeply ingrained societal instincts
prohibiting withdrawal of nourishment. 29 Daniel Callahan calls the
instinct to nourish "one of the few moral emotions that could just as
easily be called a necessary social instinct."3 According to Callahan, by allowing the "starvation" of dying patients we threaten basic
moral prohibitions against starving people to death."' A relaxation
of these principles ultimately could result in the triage of those who
are socially undesirable. References often are made in this context
to Nazi Germany's concentration camps, in which physicians were
among those who became indifferent to the values of preserving

Wikler, Not Dead, Not frying? Ethical Categories and Persistent Vegetative State, 18 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 41 (Feb.-Mar. 1988). In contrast, death after the withdrawal of AN&H

would occur sometime within five days to three weeks. Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 444 n.2, 497 N.E.2d 626, 641 n.2 (1986) (Lynch,J., dissenting). In fact, Karen Quinlan's father was amazed when asked if he wanted intravenous
feeding stopped. Ramsey, Prolonged Dying: Not Medically Indicated, 6 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 14, 16 (Feb. 1976). "Oh no, that is her nourishment," he responded. Id.
26. A dissenting judge in Brophy described some of the likely effects as follows:
Brophy's mouth would dry out and become caked or coated with thick material.
His lips would become parched and cracked. His eyes would recede back into
their orbits and his cheeks would become hollow.... The lining of his stomach
would dry out and he would experience dry heaves and vomiting.
398 Mass. at 444 n.2, 497 N.E.2d at 641 n.2 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
27. See generally Callahan, On Feeding the Dying, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 22 (Oct.
1983); Hoyt, HumanitarianDuties Brushed Aside, 120 N.J.L.J. 24 (1987); Siegler & Weisbard, Against the Emerging Stream: Should Fluids and Nutritional Support Be Discontinued, 145
ARCH. INTERN. MED. 129 (Jan. 1985).
28. Lynn & Childress, supra note 12.
29. Callahan, supra note 27.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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life.3 2
Religious groups and organizations representing special interests have been especially vocal in their opposition to living will legislation which would allow the termination of AN&H. Orthodox Jews
historically have opposed any intervention which would shorten
life.3 3 Groups representing the handicapped fear that society will
ignore its "humanitarian duty" to care for persons with disabilities
and instead will look upon those with severe handicaps as liabilities.3 4 In 1982 the general public was outraged when a severely
handicapped infant in Bloomington, Indiana was allowed to die with
no administration of nutrition or hydration.3 5 In response to public
outcry, the Department of Health and Human Services mandated
that nourishment be provided for handicapped newborns, declaring
that "the basic provision of nourishment, fluids, and routine nursing
care is a fundamental matter of human dignity, not an option for
medical judgment. "36
The position of the Catholic Church in the controversy has
been complex. The Church traditionally has viewed life as a sacred
trust over which humanity may claim stewardship but not absolute
dominion.3 7 As such, life is to be fostered and sustained. The
Church historically divided treatment into categories of "ordinary"
and "extraordinary." 3 8 The Church condemned the termination of
ordinary treatment as suicide or euthanasia. 9 In 1980 the Vatican
issued a "Declaration on Euthanasia" expressing the Catholic
Church's current position on the right to die.4 0 The Declaration
recognized certain limits upon the duty to preserve life. Aban32. Derr, Why Foodand Fluids Can Never Be Denied, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28, 2930 (Feb. 1986).
33. This is a vast simplification of the Jewish teachings on the subject. For a thoughtful interpretation of these teachings, see Nevins, Perspectives of a Jewish Physician, in By No
EXTRAORDINARY MEANS 99 (J. Lynn ed. 1986).
34. Hoyt, supra note 27.
35. J. Lynn, By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS, supra note 33, at 3.
36. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846, 30,852 (1983) (comment on proposed revision of 45 C.F,R.
§ 84.61(b)).
37. See, e.g., Bayer, Perspectivesfrom Catholic Theology, in By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS,
supra note 33, at 89-91.
38. Paris, When Burdens of Feeding Outweigh Benefits, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30, 3132 (Feb. 1986).
39. Bayer, supra note 37, at 90. The Church views willful suicide and euthanasia as
crimes against the "lofty dignity of the human person." THE SACRED CONGREGATION
FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON EUTHANASIA (1980), reprintedin PRESI-

DENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 300 (quoting Pastoral Constitution, Gaudiem et spes,
27) [hereinafter DECLARATION, reprinted in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
40. DECLARATION, reprinted in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSIoN, supra note 39.
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doning the ordinary/extraordinary distinction in cases of euthanasia, the Vatican espoused a balancing test to determine the benefits
of a treatment versus its burdens. 4 ' When death is imminent and
inevitable, the Declaration permits refusal of treatment that "would
only secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life, so
long as the normal care due to the sick person in similar cases is not
interrupted. ' 42 The Declaration further states that the refusal of
life-sustaining treatment should not be considered suicide, but
rather an "acceptance of the human condition, or a wish to avoid the
application of a medical procedure disproportionate to the results
that can be expected, or a desire not to impose excessive expense on
the family or the community. ' 43 In commentary and expert testimony, many Catholic ethicists have interpreted the Vatican's Declaration as allowing the withdrawal of all procedures, operations, or
other interventions, including AN&H, which are burdensome or
which offer no hope of benefit to a patient.4 4
Ethicists who group AN&H with other treatments which may be
withheld point out that the means of providing such treatment do
not resemble the loving spoonfuls of chicken soup which we sentimentally revere. 45 Artificial feeding has been distinguished from
natural feeding as "not part of the normal routine of living." 4 6 In
their article, Must PatientsAlways Be Given Foodand Water?,47 Doctors
Lynn and Childress describe what is entailed in providing the two
basic types of AN&H:
First, liquids can be delivered by a tube that is inserted into
a functioning gastrointestinal tract, most commonly
through the nose and esophagus into the stomach or
through a surgical incision in the abdominal wall and directly into the stomach .... The nasogastric tube is cheap;
it may lead to pneumonia and often annoys the patient and
41. In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 340, 486 A.2d 1209, 1"218 (1985).
42. DECLARATION, reprinted in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 306.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Conroy, 98 NJ. at 340, 486 A.2d at 1218; Bayer, supra note 37. At least
one Catholic theologian has looked to economic and emotional burdens placed upon
the family as well as burdens to the patient. Delio v. Westchester County Medical
Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 9-10, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 683 (1987). In 1986 the estimated cost
of keeping a patient alive in a persistent vegetative state was in excess of $13,400 per
month. Paris, supra note 38, at 31. The emotional cost to a family faced with this situation is beyond calculation.
45. See generally Lynn & Childress, supra note 12, at 20.
46. In re Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 475, 517 A.2d 886, 892 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.),
aff'd, 213 NJ. Super. 443, 517 A.2d 869 (Super Ct. App. Div. 1986) (per curiam).
47. See supra note 12.
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family, sometimes even requiring that the patient be restrained to prevent its removal.
Creating a gastrostomy [through a surgical incision] is
usually a simple . . . procedure, and, once the wound is
healed, care is very simple.... However, while elimination
of a nasogastric tube requires only removing the tube, a
gastrostomy is fairly permanent and can be closed only by
surgery.4 a
The second type of medical intervention described by Lynn and
Childress is intravenous (IV) feeding and hydration. The ordinary
hospital IV is useful only temporarily. 49 "One cannot provide a balanced diet through the veins in the limbs: to do that requires a central line, or a special catheter placed into one of the major veins in
the chest." 5 Both IV procedures may require restraining the patient, and may cause minor infections and other ill effects. 5 1
In their 1983 article, Lynn and Childress suggested that food
and water may not be administered when the procedures that would
be required are so unlikely to achieve improved nutritional and fluid'
levels that they could be considered futile, when the improvement in
nutritional and fluid balance could be of no benefit to the patient, or
when the burdens of receiving the treatment outweigh the benefits. 5 That same year, the President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Behavioral Research issued a report including AN&H among the life-prolonging treatments which
5
may be ethically withheld when they become unduly burdensome. 3
Following the Commission's report, many state and local medical
associations addressed the issue and approved guidelines allowing
the withdrawal or withholding of AN&H. 5 4 Then, in 1986, the
48. Id. at 18.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See supra note 12, at 18.
52. Id. at 18-19.
53. See PRESIDENTr's COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 3. The President's Commission
defined life-sustaining treatment as encompassing
all health care interventions that have the effect of increasing the life span of
the patient. Although the term includes respirators, kidney machines, and all
the paraphernalia of modern medicine, it also includes home physical therapy,
nursing support for activities of daily living, and special feeding procedures,
provided that one of the effects of the treatment is to prolong a patient's life.
Id.
54. These groups included the Massachusetts Medical Society, in a resolution ofJuly
1985, and the Los Angeles County Medical Association (in conjunction with the Los
Angeles County Bar Association), in guidelines ofJanuary 1986. HANDBOOK, supra note
4, at 11-12.
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American Medical Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs opined that it is ethically permissible for doctors to withhold all
life-prolonging treatment, including AN&H, from dying patients.
and from patients in an irreversible coma. 5 5 These authorities exemplify the current attitude in the medical profession that, although
in most cases it is presumed that AN&H will be provided, it may
be acceptable to forego such treatment in certain limited
circumstances.
II.

THE COURTS CONCUR WITH MEDICAL AUTHORITIES

Courts have echoed the attitude expressed by experts and
ethicists who include AN&H with other forms of medical treatment
which may be withdrawn or withheld. Before 1983 judges approved
of distinctions between ordinary and extraordinary care. 6 Then, in
October of 1983, the California Court of Appeal in Barberv. Superior
Court5 7 unanimously dismissed a murder indictment against two Los
Angeles physicians who, at the request of the family, had removed
the respirator and IV feeding apparatus from the family's husband
and father. In doing so, the court adopted as normative nearly all of
the President's Commission's recommendations on what constitutes
the appropriate care of terminally ill patients.5 Thus, in Barber an
appellate court for the first time equated the discontinuation of IV
feeding with the removal of a respirator or other medical intervention.5 9 In 1985 the NewJersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy6 ° cited
both the Barber decision and the President's Commission's reportas
authority in determining that AN&H could be withdrawn from an
55. The American Medical Association's opinion provides in part that "[1]ife prolonging medical treatment includes medication and artificially or technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration. In treating a terminally ill or irreversibly
comatose patient, the physician should determine whether the benefits of treatment outweigh its burdens. At all times, the dignity of the patient should be maintained." AMA
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, WITHHOLDING OR WITHDRAWING LIFE PRO-

LONGING MEDICAL TREATMENT (Mar.
ON AGING,

A

15, 1986), reprinted in

SENATE SPECIAL COMMITrEE

MATrER OF CHOICE: PLANNING AHEAD FOR HEALTH CARE DECISIONS,

S.

COMM. PRINT No. 211, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 77 (1986) [hereinafter SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING].

56. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 437, 497 N.E.2d 626,
637 (1986),
57. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 494 (1983).
58. Paris & Reardon, Court Responses to Withholdingor WithdrawingArtificial Nutrition and
Fluids, 253 J. A.M.A. 2243, 2244 (1985).
59. Id.
60. 98 NJ. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). For a more detailed discussion of Conroy, see
infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
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elderly woman.6 1 More recent decisions have looked to these cases
as well as to the American Medical Association's opinion 62 as being
indicative of the view of sound medical practice.63
When a state has no natural death act, or when-the existing provision does not prohibit the withdrawal or withholding of AN&H,
courts generally have had little difficulty in approving the "new"
view regarding AN&H as a form of medical treatment. When the
legislation specifically excludes nutrition and hydration from procedures which may be withdrawn, however, the court's task becomes
more troublesome. Serious questions arise in this context about the
role of the court in ethical decisionmaking.
A.

States Without Natural Death Legislation

Many states have no statutory prohibition regarding withdrawal
of food or water, either because the natural death act is not restrictive or because there is no legislation in this area'at all. In'these
jurisdictions, courts have approved withdrawing- or withholding
AN&H. New Jersey, Massachusetts, and New York are among the
states which have no natural death legislation but which have issued
important.decisions in this area.. 4
In the 1985 In re Conroy decision, New Jersey's Supreme Court
equated artificial feeding by means of a nasogastric tube or IV infusion with artificial breathing by means of a respirator.6 5 Relying in
part upon its previous decisions in Quinlan,6 6 the court ruled that in
the case of an elderly nursing home patient with a life expectancy of
less than a year, AN&H in the form of a nasogastric tube could be
discontinued. 7 The court asserted that Conroy's constitutional and
common-law rights to be free from nonconsensual treatment out61. 98 N.J. at 372-73, 486 A.2d at 1235-36.
62. See SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 55 and accompanying text.

Brophy, 398 Mass. at 439, 497 N.E.2d at 638 (court consulted views of the
63. See, e.g.,
American Medical Association and the Massachusetts Medical Society).
64. The New York case is Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d
1, 22, 26, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 691, 693 (1987) (common-law right to refuse medical treatment includes the right to forego AN&H; consequently, the wife was entitled to act in
accordance with the patient's prior clearly expressed wishes and have the use of feeding
and hydration tubes discontinued). For a discussion of the New Jersey and Massachusetts cases, see infra notes 65-90 and accompanying text. Other states include Delaware
and Ohio. See In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 564, 747 P.2d 445, 455
(1987).
65. 98 N.J. 321, 373, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (1985).
66. Id. at 356-59, 486 A.2d at 1227-28.
67. Id. at 374, 486 A.2d at 1236. The decision is limited to cases where medical
evidence can establish that the patient fits within the "Conroy pattern": an elderly, incompetent nursing home resident with severe and permanent mental and physical im-
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weighed any state or professional interest to the contrary.6 8
The Conroy court enunciated a "subjective test" to determine
whether treatment should be withdrawn or withheld.6 9 Under this
test, a court should look to a living will or durable power of attorney
as an expression of a patient's intent not to have life-sustaining
medical intervention. 70 Thus, although living wills may not be legally binding in jurisdictions without natural death legislation, they
may be used as evidence of a patient's wishes.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hospital, Inc. 7 1 looked to Conroy with approval in countering many of the arguments that AN&H somehow differs from
other forms of treatment. 72 Patricia Brophy was the wife of a fortyfive-year-old firefighter in a persistent vegetative state 73 with no reasonable possibility for return to cognitive life. She petitioned the
court for removal of her husband's gastrostomy tube. 74 The court
held that the substituted judgment for an incompetent person in a
persistent vegetative state must be honored.7 5 Citing as authority a
number of judicial decisions and professional opinions, including
Conroy and the President's Commission and American Medical Assopairments and a life expectancy of approximately one year or less. Id. at 342, 486 A.2d
at 1219.
68. Id. at 353, 486 A.2d at 1225.
69. 98 NJ. at 384, 486 A.2d at 1242. The court in fact set forth three tests. When
there is a living will or other evidence of a patient's intent, the court may apply the
subjective test. If the patient's intent has not been expressed or is ambiguous, the court
looks to two additional tests. Under the "limited objective test" the court looks to other
trustworthy but more remote evidence in conjunction with medical evidence that the
burdens of treatment outweigh its benefits. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232. Under the
"pure objective test" the court will allow the withholding or withdrawal of treatment
even if there is no evidence of what the patient would want if medical evidence indicates
that the burdens of treatment clearly outweigh its benefits and that the unavoidable pain
involved in such treatment is such that its administration would be inhumane. Id. at 366,
486 A.2d at 1232. In Conroy the court found that evidence produced at the trial court
level was insufficient to satisfy any of the three tests. Id. at 387, 486 A.2d at 1243. (Ms.
Conroy had died, nasogastric tube in place, while the appeal was pending. Id. at 341,
486 A.2d at 1219.) 70. Id. at 360-61, 486 A.2d at 1229-30.
71. 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
72. Id. at 435, 497 N.E.2d at 636.
73. Id. at 422, 497 N.E.2d at 628. A persistent vegetative state is probably the most
common form of permanent unconsciousness. Patients in a persistent vegetative state
perceive neither themselves nor their environment. A neurological examination reveals
no neocortical functions. Yet such patients do have sleep-wake cycles, and at times their
eyes open. From a neurological standpoint, they do not experience pain, suffering or
cognition. Cranford, Patients With Permanent Loss of Consciousness, in By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS, supra note 33, at 186, 187.
74. 398 Mass. at 422, 497 N.E.2d at 628-29.
75. Id. at 433, 497 N.E.2d at 635.
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ciation reports, the Brophy court grouped artificial feeding with
other medical treatment which may be refused.7" The court rejected the finding that Brophy might experience a painful death if
his artificial feeding were discontinued, citing the testimony of several medical experts that 7a7 person in a persistent vegetative state
feels no pain or suffering.
The Brophy court rejected the lower court's finding that artificial
feeding was not intrusive, stating that for Brophy, maintenance,
possibly for several years, through a "G-tube" indeed was intrusive
even though it was not necessarily painful. 78 The court also determined that upon removal of the tube Brophy's death would be
to swallow rather than by the discontinuation
caused by his inability
79
feeding.
of artificial
The NewJersey Supreme Court looked to the Brophy decision as
well as its own Quinlan and Conroy precedents when it reexamined
the termination of treatment issue in a trilogy of recent decisions, In
re Farrell,"° In re Peter,"' and In re Jobes.s2 The court reaffirmed in
Farrell its ruling in Conroy that a patient's right to refuse medical
treatment is protected by common-law and constitutional rights
83
even though exercise of that right means personal injury or death.
Both Peter andJobes involved withdrawal of AN&H from patients in a
84
persistent vegetative state who had not authored living wills.
In Peter the court extended application of the Conroy subjective
test to patients in a persistent vegetative state who were likely to
survive over a year.8 5 The court found that once a court has decided
that a patient would have terminated treatment if competent, regardless of the medical condition or life expectancy, the patient's
right to self-determination preempts application of any other standard.8 6 The best evidence to use in making this decision, said the
76. Id. at 439, 497 N.E.2d at 638.
77. Id. at 426, 497 N.E.2d at 631.
78. 398 Mass. at 435, 497 N.E.2d at 636. The court observed that I patient had
survived 37 years in this condition. Id. at 437, 497 N.E.2d at 637.
79. Id. at 439, 497 N.E.2d at 638.
80. 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987).
81. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
82. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
83. 108 N.J. at 347-48, 529 A.2d at 410. Thus, a patient and the patient's family
could authorize disconnection of a respirator without judicial review.
84. In Jobes the court set forth guidelines for surrogate decisionmaking by family
members for a patient who failed to adequately express in any fashion her wishes about
life-sustaining treatment. 108 NJ. at 426-28, 529 A.2d at 451-52.
85. 108 N.J. at 377, 529 A.2d at 425.
86. Id. at 377-78, 529 A.2d at 425.
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court, is a patient's living will. 8 7 Although Helen Peter had not executed a living will, she had delegated the power to make general
medical decisions to a friend.8 8 Peter had not specifically authorized
the friend to terminate treatment; however, the court accepted
statements that she had directed the friend orally to decline life-sustaining treatment on her behalf as clear and convincing evidence
that she would have chosen withdrawal of treatment.8 9 In re Peter is
the first appellate decision in the country to expressly declare that
when a patient appoints a health care proxy, the proxy may make
termination of treatment decisions, even though the durable power
of attorney statute does not specifically extend a proxy's authority to
medical decisions. 0 Consequently, it appears that one may use a
health care proxy to effect the individual's desired health care treatment while avoiding the restrictions of a living will statute.
Many states have adopted natural death legislation defining lifesustaining procedures in a general way, without specific mention of
AN&H or food and water. Legislatures enacted the majority of
these statutes prior to 1983 when the President's Commission's report and the Barber decision first made AN&H an issue.9 At that
time, legislatures probably did not contemplate the significance of
AN&H when drafting statutes.
Washington's Natural Death Act," passed in 1979, is one such
silent statute. With In re Guardianship of Grant, 3 the Washington
Supreme Court recently determined that a guardian could decide to
withhold AN&H from her daughter who had become incapacitated
by a degenerative disease. Because the daughter had been rendered
incompetent by the disease at age fourteen, she had never authored
a living will or otherwise stated her feelings concerning life-sustaining treatment. 9 4 Therefore, the court held that the Natural
95
Death Act did not apply.
87.
88.
89.
90.
(1987).
91.

92.

Id. at 378, 529 A.2d at 426.
Id.
108 N.J. at 379, 529 A.2d at426.
SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, INC., RIGHT-TO-DIE COURT DECISIONS

NJ-16

See Horan, supra note 20, at 107.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§§ 70.122.010 to -.905 (Supp. 1987).

93. 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987).
94. Id. at 550, 747 P.2d at 448. The patient had been of above average intelligence
as a young child. Over a period of about 18 years, an incurable condition of the central
nervous system had slowly rendered her "almost vegetacive" with virtually no cognitive
functions. Id. at 548, 747 P.2d at 447. Physicians agreed that her death in the near
future was inevitable. Id.
95. Id. at 553, 747 P.2d at 449. The legislature had made no pronouncement re-
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The trial court in Grant had ruled that the guardian could not
make decisions concerning the withdrawal or withholding of lifesustaining treatment from her ward.96 The Washington Supreme
Court reversed. Relying upon two prior decisions concerning lifesustaining treatment other than AN&H, the court ruled that the
State's natural death legislation did not prescribe the exclusive
97
method for withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.
Although it did not explicitly so provide, the guardianship statute
could be applied in making these decisions. In addition, the court
indicated that the State's newly enacted substitute consent statute
provided another vehicle for making decisions concerning life-sustaining treatment. 98
From the foregoing decisions, it is apparent that despite the absence of validating legislation, courts will acknowledge the constitutional and common-law rights to forego life-sustaining treatment,
including AN&H. In upholding these rights, courts look first to the
living will and durable power of attorney as significant evidence of
intent. Such rulings may be instrumental in determining that a patient's right to forego life-sustaining treatment may not be curtailed
by any legislative effort to limit the forms of treatment which may be
terminated.
B.

States With Legislation Restricting the Right
to Withhold or Withdraw AN&H

The decisions discussed in the previous section allow the withdrawal of AN&H if the jurisdiction lacks natural death legislation or
if an existing statute does not exclude AN&H. The New Jersey,
Massachusetts, and Washington courts, like courts in otherjurisdictions, based the right to forego life-sustaining treatment on constitutional and common-law rights. 9 9 Many courts have interpreted
the penumbral right to privacy as including the right to make one's
garding AN&H, noted the court. Id. at 558-59, 747 P.2d at 452. The court acknowledged that generally the legislature is the appropriate authority to resolve this issue.
Nevertheless, the court decided to address the issue because it was an immediate problem brought to the court, and not an academic problem for the legislature to answer at
some future date. Id. at 564-65, 747 P.2d at 455.
96. Id. at 565, 747 P.2d at 456.
97. 109 Wash. 2d at 565-66, 747 P.2d at 456.
98. Id. at 566, 747 P.2d at 456.
99. See infra notes 102-117 and accompanying text. As the discussion of Corbett v.
D'Allessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla.
1986), indicates, the source of these rights is not beyond dispute. See infra notes 102114 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the author believes that although it may be
difficult to pinpoint a specific source, the aggregate combination of constitutional and
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own health care decisions.'0 0 The common law protects a person's
right to make decisions about medical treatment, whether wise or
unwise, and prohibits nonconsensual invasion of bodily integrity.' 0 '
A problem arises, however, when the exercise of these rights conflicts with a natural death statute which limits the forms of treatment
which may be withdrawn or withheld.
In Corbett v. D'Allessandro'0 2 the Florida District Court of Appeals held that the right to have a nasogastric tube removed was a
federal and state onstitutional right which could not be limited by
legislation. Helen Corbett, a seventy-three-year-old patient, had
been in a persistent vegetative state for years with no reasonable
prospect of regaining cognitive brain function.'0 She had not executed a living will, nor had she designated anyone to make treatment decisions for her.' 4 Although the trial court recognized that a
right to privacy exists which includes the right to terminate extraordinary treatment, it was troubled by the fact that Florida's natural death statute specifically excluded "sustenance" from the
common-law principles establishes a right to forego AN&H as well as other forms of
medical treatment.
100. See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 430, 497
N.E.2d 626, 633 (1986) ("The right of a patient to refuse medical treatment arises both
from the common law and the unwritten and penumbral constitutional right of privacy."); In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 553, 747 P.2d 445, 449 (1987)
("[T]he right to refuse life sustaining treatment is not a mere creation of statute.... [lit
stems from both the constitutional right of privacy and the common-law right to be free
of bodily invasion." (footnote omitted)). See also Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207,
214-15, 741 P.2d 674, 681-82 (1987) (although the Supreme Court has not yet held that
the right to privacy encompasses the right to refuse medical treatment, numerous state
courts have reasoned from Supreme Court decisions that the right to privacy is "broad
enough to grant an individual the right to chart his or her own medical treatment plan").
The Rasmussen court noted that the "state action" requirement for constitution protection was established by state authority to regulate and license physicians and medical
treatment facilities and to supervise the guardianship of incapacitated persons. Id. at
215 n.9, 741 P.2d at 682 n.9. These factors taken together created a "sufficiently close
nexus" between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the
action of the latter may be treated as that of the State itself. Id. (citingJackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
101. Brophy, 398 Mass. at 430, 497 N.E.2d at 633. As Judge Cardozo wrote in 1914,
"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
should be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without
his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914). Even in emergencies, consent will not be implied if the patient has previously
stated that he would not consent. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 376, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70,
438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272 (1981).
102. 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986).
103. Id. at 370.
104. Id.
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treatments which could be discontinued.' 0 5
The Court of Appeals, however, found the legislation irrelevant
to the case, explaining that it was enacted to control particular fact
situations only and was "not intended to encompass the entire spectrum of instances in which ... privacy rights may be exercised."' '
Although it noted that the Florida legislature had specifically provided that the natural death statute could not impair existing constitutional and common-law rights, the court found that even absent
express legislative recognition, the right to refuse treatment could
0 7
not be limited by statute.
Although the court's language in Corbett is promising to those
who would include a provision regarding AN&H in their advance
directives, it is by no means conclusive. Corbett held that living will
legislation will not affect otherwise existing constitutional and com108
mon-law rights in situations in which the statute does not apply.
Although courts in other jurisdictions might follow the Corbett court
in relying upon state constitutional rights to privacy, including the
right to forego treatment, the validity of relying upon the United
States Constitution for this right is open to question.' 0 9 Many
scholars take a skeptical view of the Constitution's penumbral
rights.1" ° While state courts have held that the federal right to privacy extends to the refusal of treatment, the only federal court to
confront the issue based its decision on common-law rather than
constitutional grounds."'
The President's Commission also questioned the extent of pro105. Id.
106. 487 So. 2d at 370.
107. Id. at 372.
108. Id. at 370-71.
109. See Areen, supra note 1, at 232. See also Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 376-77, 420 N.E.2d at
70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73 (declining to consider the "disputed question" as to whether
the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is supported by the Constitution because
common-law principles adequately support the right).
110. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 529 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Some authorities recognize a Court-created right to privacy but question its source and its extent. See, e.g.,
Ely, The Wages of Ciying Wolf" A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
929, 931-32 (1973); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1423, 1427
(1974).
111. See Areen, supra note 1,at 232. In Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp.,
602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985), the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia determined that a federal hospital must honor a competent cancer patient's
request that a respirator be removed. "Necessarily implicit" in the common-law right of
informed consent, said the court, is the right of one who enters treatment in ignorance
to later insist that treatment be terminated. Id. at 1455.
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tection afforded by common-law rights. According to the Commission, common-law rights which are firmly established to protect the
2
right to forego treatment would not require validation by statute."1
As a result of perceived weaknesses in constitutional and commonlaw rights, the explicit disclaimer contained in the Florida statute,
which also is contained in other state statutes,' 13 may be rendered
meaningless.
An additional difficulty with a broad reading of Corbett is the
court's statement that in cases in which the living will act applies, the
legislature's mandate will exclude the right to decline AN&H.'"
Under this seemingly paradoxical reasoning, one who fails to author
a living will may have broader rights than one who meets the requirements of the Florida act. Thus, while Corbett lends support to
those who would include a provision regarding AN&H in their living
wills, it is by no means clear that their wishes will be respected.
A recent ruling in Maine may more firmly support those who
5
add provisions about AN&H to their wills. With In re Gardner 1
Maine's Supreme Court, like the Corbett court, determined that limitations regarding AN&H in that state's living will act did not apply
in the case of a patient in a persistent vegetative state who had not
authored a living will. The court held that the legislation neither
created a presumption concerning a person without a living will, nor
limited the court's power to read more broadly under Maine common law the right of a patient to make decisions concerning lifesustaining care." 6 Unlike the Florida court in Corbett, the Gardner
court did not find that the act excluded the right to forego AN&H in
cases in which there was a living will." 7 If Gardnerfailed to squarely
address the question of what would occur when a living will includes
provisions concerning AN&H contrary to the natural death act, at
least it did not explicitly create the possible paradox of Corbett.

112. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 145.
113. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7193 (West Supp. 1988); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 6-2429 (Supp. 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-22 (Supp. 1987); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 5-610 (Supp. 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 137-H:16 (Supp. 1987); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, § 11 (Supp. 1988).
114487 So. 2d at 370.
115. 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987).
116. Id. at 952 n.3.
117. In other words, although the Maine legislature had not spoken on the issue of
life-sustaining treatment when there is no living will, the court did not surmise that if
Gardner had left a living will, the natural death act's prohibitions would apply. Id.
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IN MARYLAND

Decisions in other jurisdictions indicate that when there is no
natural death statute or when an existing statute does not provide
for AN&H, the courts will affirm a patient's right to forego AN&H.
In states in which natural death legislation does appear to prohibit
the termination of AN&H, courts are beginning to rule that common-law and constitutional rights to forego treatment are paramount to any legislative mandate to the contrary. Maryland's
restrictive natural death statute has not yet been challenged by a
judicial determination of the right to forego AN&H." 8
A.

Under the Life-Sustaining Procedures Act

In Maryland, section 5-602 of the Life-Sustaining Procedures
Act (the Act) provides that any qualified individual may include a
declaration in his or her will directing the withholding or withdrawal
of life-sustaining procedures. " 9 Section 5-601 (e) of the Act defines
a "life-sustaining procedure" as
any medical procedure, treatment, or intervention which
uses mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a spontaneous vital function or is otherwise of such a nature as to afford a patient no reasonable
expectation of recovery from a terminal condition and
which, when applied to a patient in a terminal condition,
would serve to secure20 only a precarious and burdensome
prolongation of life.'
Seemingly, AN&H would fall within this definition. Nevertheless,
section 5-605 of the Act states that a declaration of.a qualified patient to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures may not be
implemented by "the denial of food, water, or of such medication
and medical procedures as are necessary to provide comfort care or
alleviate pain."' 2 ' The declaration form suggested by the Life-Sustaining Procedures Act provides that the declarant will be "permit118. As this comment went to press, however, the Attorney General for the State of
Maryland issued an advisory opinion, declaring that both the constitution and common
law created a right to forego AN&H under certain circumstances. The opinion, one of
the first offered by a state attorney general on the topic, states that the right may be
exercised by a patient through a living will or a durable power of attorney. Additionally,
a guardian with court consent, and under some circumstances family members, may exercise the right for a disabled patient. 73 Op. Att'y Gen. (Md.) No. 88-046 (Oct. 17,
1988), reported in The Sun (Baltimore), Oct. 18, 1988, at IA, cols. 5-6 & 1IA, cols. 4-6.
119. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-602 (Supp. 1987).

120. Id. § 5-601(e).
121. Id. § 5-605.
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ted to die naturally with only the administration of medication, the
administration of food and water, and the performance of any medical procedure that is necessary to provide comfort care or alleviate
pain. "122 The Act's preamble explains that these provisions are "intended to ensure that such basic measures as nursing care, nutri23
tion, and hydration will be maintained."'1
Despite the statutory prohibition, the Society for the Right to
Die, among other groups, encourages Maryland residents to add
12 4
provisions about the withdrawal of AN&H to their living wills.
The Life-Sustaining Procedures Act authorizes the insertion of special provisions into the declaration, as long as they are not inconsistent with the rest of the Act.'1 5 The Society asserts that the
additional provisions are not inconsistent. The Act's language concerning forms of sustenance is ambiguous because AN&H is so unlike "food and water."' 26 In addition, the Society argues that the
statute does not exclude all food and water from procedures that
may be discontinued, but that it prohibits discontinuation of food
and water only to the extent that it is "necessary to provide comfort
' 27
care or to alleviate pain."'
The Act does not define the terms "food and water." The provision of AN&H is drastically different from traditional notions of
nourishment, since AN&H more closely resembles forms of
mechanical medical treatment. Therefore, courts and medical experts have determined that AN&H is grouped more appropriately
with life-sustaining procedures other than food and water. Looking
solely to the plain language of the Act, there is some ambiguity as to
whether artificial forms of nourishment are to be included. A staff
report prepared for the House of Delegates, however, specifically
advises that AN&H is to be included with other forms of nutrition
and hydration. 12 The living will is exercisable by a patient who is

diagnosed to be in a terminal condition, caused by injury, disease,
122. Id. § 5-602(c)(1).
123. Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, ch. 620, 1985 Md. Laws 2944, 2945 (codified as
amended at MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1987)).
124. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 21.
125, MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-602(c)(2) (Supp. 1987).
126. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 21.
127. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-605 (Supp. 1987). See also HANDBOOK, supra

note 4, at 6. Landsmen & Mertes, Delivery of Legal Services: Slow Death in a Nursing Home,
XXI MD. B.J. 45, 47 (Mar.-Apr. 1988). This reading of § 5-605 seems strained and inconsistent with the statute's punctuation.
128. ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS COMM., MD. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, COMM. REPORT ON
H.B. 453 TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1985, at 6-7 (1985) [hereinafter REPORT ON H.B.
4531.
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or illness which makes death imminent and from which there can be
no recovery despite the application of life-sustaining procedures.1 29
According to the report, such a patient usually is comatose.' 30 Application of AN&H is a common method of providing food and
water for the patient.' 3 ' The report, therefore, indicates that the
legislators meant to include AN&H with "food and water."
Any possible confusion remaining over the language of the Act
may be dispelled by looking at its legislative history. The Life-Sustaining Procedures Act,' 31' was passed in 1985 after twelve years of
effort. 13 3 A consolidation of two separate bills,' 3 4 the Act was approved by the legislature only when the Maryland Catholic Conference (MCC) dropped its opposition. 3 5 Six single-spaced pages of
amendments were added to the proposed Act at the MCC's request. 13 6 One of the key compromises necessary for passage was
the adoption of provisions prohibiting withdrawal or withholding of
37
nutrition and hydration.'
In accordance with the Vatican's statement of 1980,138 Richard
Dowling, Executive Director of the MCC, testified before the legislative committee examining the proposed Act, that "the living will is
not inconsistent with Church teaching."' 3 9 The MCC, however, had
opposed previous legislative attempts to codify the "living will concept" for fear that statutory imprecision would "crack open the door
to serious abuses affecting the sacredness of human life."' 4 ° In
1984 the National Conference of Catholic Bishops' Committee on
Pro-Life Activities published a statement setting guidelines for liv-

129. Id. at 1, 3.
130. Id. at 6.
131. Id. at 7.
132. Ch.620, 1985 Md. Laws 2944 (codified as amended at MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE.
ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1987)).
133. REPORT ON H.B. 453, supra note 128, at 2.
134. The Sun (Baltimore), Mar. 19, 1985, at ID, col. 1.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2D, col. 4.
137. Supporters of the original legislation were reported to be particularly unhappy
with that change, but said that a compromise victory was better than a defeat. Seiden,
Personal Tragedy Helps 'Living Will' Bill in House, The Sun (Baltimore), Mar. 27, 1985, at
2F, col. 5.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 37-44.
139. Statement of the Maryland Catholic Conference on "Living Will" Legislation Before the
Committee on Environmental Matters, Maryland House of Delegates, 1985 Sess. at 1 (Feb. 19,
1985) (statement of Richard J. Dowling, Executive Director, the MCC) [hereinafter

Statement].
140. Id. at 2.
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ing will legislation.' 4 1 Dowling testified that the MCC's new support
of the proposed Act was due in part to the "strengthening" of the
Act by its sponsors, 4 2 who essentially had adopted the Bishops'
Committee guidelines.
Serious concern over recent court decisions in other states was
an additional incentive for the MCC to approve the proposed Act.
Dowling testified to the legislative committee that he was troubled
by what he saw as an implicit message from the judiciary to individuals in states withodt natural death legislation: "Tell us whether or
not you want life-sustaining treatment continued, withheld, or withdrawn, or we, the courts, will decide for you and, in the majority of
cases, we will decide that such treatment should be withheld or withdrawn rather than initiated or continued." 4 ' Dowling referred specifically to Conroy, which had been decided a few months prior to his
testimony.144 He expressed particular concern that the New Jersey
Supreme Court included "even hydration and nutrition" among the
forms of treatment which may be withheld. 45 Because Conroy concerned artificial nutrition and hydration in the form of a nasogastric
tube, it is apparent that the MCC amendments adopted by the
House of Delegates were meant to exclude both natural and artificial forms of food and water from procedures which may be
discontinued.
Also amended at the MCC's request was the proposed Act's
definition of life-sustaining treatment which may be withdrawn or
withheld.' 4 6 The new language, adopted verbatim from the MCC,
replaced a definition which the MCC deemed "vague" and "synonymous with medical procedures in general."'147 Although the plain
meaning of the definition as amended seemingly includes AN&H,' 48
the Act's express prohibitions as well as its legislative history indicate that AN&H is to be distinguished from other forms of life-sustaining treatment. As a result, the Act's definition of life-sustaining
treatment, as it pertains to AN&H, is ambiguous at best.
141. COMMITTEE FOR PRO-LIFE AcrlvrTiEs, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHoPS, GUIDELINES FOR LEGISLATION ON LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT (Nov. 10, 1984).
142. Statement, supra note 139, at 2.
143. Id. at 3.

144. Id. at 2-3.
145. Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
146. See supra text accompanying note 120.

147. Letter from Richard J. Dowling to Delegate Larry Young, Chairperson, House
Envtl. Matters Comm., at 6 (Feb. 25, 1985) (discussing the MCC proposed amendments
to the General Assembly's living will legislation).
148. See supra text accompanying note 120.
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Although it would appear that those who add provisions to
their living wills requesting termination of AN&H are acting contrary to the Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, the legislation, like Florida's legislation in Corbett, provides that its provisions are cumulative
and may not be construed to impair or supersede any existing legal
right or responsibility.' 4 9 Dowling's testimony makes it clear that
the MCC's mission in supporting the proposed Act was to deter the
50
Maryland judiciary from independently defining broader rights.1
In the foreseeable future Maryland courts may face the Corbett questions of whether a patient's common-law or constitutional rights still
exist despite statutory language to the contrary. Unlike Corbett and
Gardner, in which the patients had never authored a living will, there
may be the added factor of a patient's express directive that AN&H
be withdrawn.
B.

Maryland's Durable Power of Attorney
and Other Statutes-BroaderRights?

The New Jersey court in Peter interpreted the state's power of
attorney statute to enable conveyance of the power to make medical
decisions,. even though the statute does not expressly so authorize.1 5 1 This is far from the original purpose of the power of attorney. Powers of attorney statutes traditionally have been used to
facilitate commercial transactions and the management of property.152 Because an adult must be competent to convey this authority and must always be able to revoke it, historically powers of
attorney revoked automatically upon the incompetency of the
maker.'15 In order to enable powers of attorney to extend-beyond
the maker's competency, state legislatures have enacted laws permitting them to be "durable."'' 54 In Maryland, in order for a power
of attorney to be durable it must explicitly state words showing the
intent of the principal that the authority be exercisable notwith55
standing disability.'
At least one authority in Maryland has found no reason why the
existing durable power of attorney cannot be employed as an advance planning tool for health care decisionmaking.1 5 6 If they are
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

MD.HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-610 (Supp. 1987).

See supra text accompanying notes 132-145.
108 NJ. 365, 393-94, 529 A.2d 419, 429-30 (1987).
SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 55, at 32.
Id.
Id. at 33. See, e.g., MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 13-601 to -602 (1974).
MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-601 (1974).
Bacharach, Substitute Consentfor Medical Care, I THE BARRISTER 21, 22 (Oct. 1983).
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allowed as tools for proxy medical decisionmaking, powers of attorney seemingly may be used more broadly than living wills. Not only
will they be activated in a greater number of circumstances,1 5 7 but
there is no provision similar to that in the living will statute disallowing termination of food or water.
Two states specifically provide for the use of a power of attor5
ney as a means of delegating health care decisionmaking.5'
Only
the New Jersey court has ruled on the extent that a power of attorney may be used to make medical decisions absent enabling legislation.' - 9 The problem with such a broad reading of these statutes is
their origin in property law. The President's Commission warned of
possible abuse when powers of attorney are used out of their original context.' 60 In 1984 New York's Attorney General concluded
that the general delegation of health care decisionmaking may not
be made by power of attorney, although an agent identified in a
power of attorney may be designated to communicate the patient's
decision to decline medical treatment. 6 ' The traditional durable
power of attorney, according to the Attorney General's opinion, is
"an uncertain vehicle" for delegating general authority for making
health care decisions.' 6 2 Nevertheless, the Senate Special Committee on Aging has indicated that despite this uncertainty it is probable that a court will accept an incapacitated person's designation of
a proxy health care decisionmaker through a durable power of attorney because courts generally accept clear and convincing evidence
63
of a patient's desire regarding health care.'
The relation of the durable power of attorney to health care in
Maryland is affirmed somewhat by language in section 20-107 of the
Health-General Article, the so-called "substitute consent" statute.t64 That statute provides that a durable power of attorney "that
157. The durable power of attorney may be used to make decisions on behalf of individuals who are not terminally ill but who nonetheless are incapable of making their own
decisions. This would include patients who are permanently unconscious or suffering
from an incapacitating degenerative disease. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, Supra
note 55, at 34.
158. The two states are California and Pennsylvania. J. SMITH, HOSPITAL LABIUTY
§ 13.04(1)(b) (1986).
1-59. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
160. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 147.
161. Op. Att'y Gen. (N.Y.) No. 84-F16 (Dec. 28, 1984), quoted in SENATE SPECIAL
COMM. ON AGING, supra note 55, at 33 n.83.
162. Id.
163. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 55, at 33. See also J. SMITH, supra
note 158.
164. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Supp. 1987).

1988]

FOREGOING ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND HYDRATION

1211

relates to medical care" preempts the ability of family members to
substitute their consent for furnishing medical care to a disabled individual 6 5 Although this language recognizes that a power of attorney may be durable and may relate to health care, the scope of
the substitute consent statute probably does not include decisions
regarding the termination of life-sustaining treatment. The decisions which may be made through substituted consent under section
20-107 are those for "furnishing medical or dental care and treatment to a disabled individual."' 6 6 The statute provides that substitute consent may not be utilized for abortions, sterilization, or the
observation, diagnosis, treatment, or hospitalization for a mental
disorder. 6 7 These delineated limitations, combined with reports
from legislative hearings,' 6 8 indicate that the substitute consent statute was promulgated in order to provide an easy means of obtaining
consent for cases involving minor disabilities without having to ful16 9
fill the cumbersome requirements of guardianship.
A bill proposed to the Maryland House of Delegates in 1985
attempting to augment existing powers of attorney with a separate
durable power of attorney for health care failed to reach the House
17
floor. 170 The MCC had serious reservations about this bill. '
165. Id. § 20-107(d). Similarly, Maryland's recently enacted Patient Care Advisory
Committee Law, MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 19-370 to -374 (Supp. 1987), includes
"an individual with a power of attorney to make a decision with a medical consequence
for a patient" in its delineation of persons to whom notification of a patient's rights
should be given by the Committee. Id. § 19-374. This is an additional confirmation of
the role of a durable power of attorney in matters relating to health care.
166. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-107(d) (Supp. 1987).
167. Id. § 20-107(0(1).
168. "[S.B. 433] doesn't do anything drastic. It codifies what is common law practice
in the State.... Guardianship procedure costs a great deal of money. This is a compromise so that pepole [sic] will not have to go to court on every little thing." FINANCE
COMM., MD. SENATE, DISABLED INDIVIDUALS-CONSENT TO MEDICAL OR DENTAL CARE,
HEARING ON S.B. 433 (Feb. 23, 1984) (statement by Delegate Toth).
169. Maryland's guardianship statute, MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 13-704 to
-710 (Supp. 1986), through which a court may appoint a guardian for a minor or disabled person, authorizes a guardian to "give necessary consent or approval for medical
or other professional care, counsel, treatment, or service." MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE
ANN. § 13-708(b)(8) (Supp. 1986). Court approval is required, however, prior to the use
of any medical procedure involving a substantial risk to life. Id. It is unlikely that the
legislature intended substitute consent as a facile means to circumvent this requirement.
170. H.B. 1456, a bill introduced by Delegate Hixson to establish a durable power of
attorney for health care, was read on February 1, 1985, and assigned to the House Committee on Environmental Matters. The proposed bill provided in part that except as
otherwise specified in the document, the durable power of attorney for health care
would give the agent the power to consent to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment. H.B. 1456, 1985 Sess.
17 1. Letter from Richard J. Dowling to Delegate Larry Young, supra note 147, at 4.
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Adopting the position of the Conference of Catholic Bishops, the
MCC has stated that it wants to ensure that any legislation in this
area avoids granting unlimited power to a proxy decisionmaker to
make a critical health care decision on a patient's behalf.' 72 As it
stands, although Maryland's durable power of attorney does not
have provisions similar to those in the living will regarding food and
water, its status in enabling the termination of life-sustaining treatment is uncertain.
C. Relevant Decisions in Maryland Courts
Because ethicists and medical experts consider AN&H a form of
medical treatment, decisions regarding its application are subject to
general rules requiring informed consent.17 The doctrine of informed consent grew out of the common-law right to bodily integrity. 174 The right to informed consent was first recognized by
Maryland's Court of Appeals in Sard v. Hardy, a medical malpractice
case. 175 The court determined that a physician must advise a patient
of any material risk or dangers of treatment so as to enable the patient to make "an intelligent and informed choice about whether or
not to undergo such treatment."176 This doctrine "follows logically
from the universally recognized rule- that a physician, treating a
mentally competent adult under non-emergency circumstances, can not properly undertake to perform surgery or administer other therapy without" the patient's prior consent. 77 Although Sard involved
elective surgery, courts in other states have used the right to informed consent as a basis for the right to refuse life-sustaining treat78
ment, including AN&H.'
The Maryland Court of Appeals was given an opportunity to
172. Id.
173. See Landsman, Terminating Food and Water: Emerging Legal Rules, in By No ExTRAORDINARY MEANS,

supra note 33, at 135.

174. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 346, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985).
175. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977).
176. Id. at 439, 379 A.2d at 1020 (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 438-39, 379 A.2d at 1019.
178. See, e.g., In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 951 (Me. 1987) ("The personal right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment is now firmly anchored in the common law doctrine of
informed consent"); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 347, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985) ("The
patient's ability to control his bodily integrity through informed consent is significant
only when one recognizes that this right also encompasses a right to informed refusal.").
But see Sard, 281 Md. at 439, 379 A.2d at 1019 ("The fountainhead of the doctrine of
informed consent is the patient's right to exercise control over his own body, at least when
undergoingelective surgery, by deciding for himself whether or not to submit to the particular therapy." (emphasis added)).
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interpret a patient's right to refuse treatment in Mercy Hospital, Inc.
v. Jackson.179 That case involved the right of a Jehovah's witness to
refuse blood transfusions during a caesarian delivery. The court,
however, found the case moot because resolution of constitutional
issues was no longer necessary and the precise factual circumstances
were unlikely to recur. s8
Although the court of appeals vacated the decision, the opinion
by the court of special appeals in Mercy Hospital provides a useful
basis for discussing the right to refuse treatment in Maryland. The
court of special appeals found that, consistent with the right of informed consent, a competent adult may refuse blood transfusions
when the refusal is made knowingly and voluntarily and will not endanger a third party.'' Thus, the court affirmed a circuit court
82
judge's refusal to appoint a guardian to authorize the transfusion.1
In rendering its decision, the court of special appeals relied in part
upon an amicus curiae brief by the State of Maryland acknowledging
that the State's "interest in the preservation of life is not necessarily
absolute.' 8 " The court cited portions of the substitute consent
statute which provide that a health care provider may not rely upon
substituted consent to give treatment that the provider knows is
against a patient's religious belief.'8 4 According to the Mercy Hospital court, this is an "emphatic legislative mandate that the patient's
decision regarding the type of treatment the patient shall endure is
paramount. The statute goes so far as to declare that, in the final
analysis, it is the patient who determines whether there shall be any
treatment at all."' 8 5 The court reasoned that certainly the protection afforded a competent adult will be no less than that afforded to
the disabled under section 20-107.186
179. 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985), vacatedfor mootness, 306 Md. 556, 510
A.2d 562 (1986). For a more detailed discussion, see Bamberger, Mercy Hospital, Inc. v.
Jackson: A Recurring Dilemma for Health Care Providers in the Treatment ofJehovah's Witnesses,
46 MD. L. REv. 514 (1987).
180. 306 Md. at 564-65, 510 A.2d at 566. In a strongly worded dissent, Judge McAuliffe stated that the Mercy Hospital case, while itself moot, should have been heard as a
"textbook example" of an important question of substantial public concern which is
"'capable of repetition yet evading review.'" Id. at 565, 510 A.2d at 566 (McAuliffe, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. International Communication
Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1974)).
181. Mercy Hospital, 62 Md. App. at 418, 489 A.2d at 1134.
182. Id. at 412, 489 A.2d at 1131.
183. Id. at 415, 489 A.2d at 1133.
184. Id at 416, 489 A.2d at 1134. See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-107(b)
(Supp. 1987).
185. Mercy Hospital, 62 Md. App. at 417, 489 A.2d at 1134.
186. Idl The court noted that the Patient's Bill of Rights as delineated by the Joint
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The court of special appeals indicated in Mercy Hospital that it
will respect a competent patient's right to decline medical treatment. As of yet the Maryland courts have not issued any decisions
which determine the extent to which a competent person may instruct in advance for the termination of treatment. Other states,
however, have indicated that there is no reason that the rights of a
patient who formerly was competent should be more narrowly construed than those of a patient who is competent at the time of
87
treatment.'
IV.

PROGNOSIS AND PROPOSALS-A NEED FOR CLARIFICATION

The perimeters of the right to die are disturbingly unclear
under Maryland's current legislative scheme. Because of what was
considered a necessary compromise, the proposed Life-Sustaining
Procedures Act was amended to include provisions limiting the
withdrawal or withholding of food and water.'8 8 A study of the circumstances surrounding the Act's approval by the legislature yields
the conclusion that the legislature intended the terms "food and
water" to include AN&H. While Maryland's durable power of attorney statute carries no such restriction, the existing durable power of
attorney is an unsure vehicle for making important medical
decisions.
The legislature carefully should reexamine Maryland's natural
death legislation in light of recent medical and judicial findings
about AN&H. AN&H is not mere sustenance; it is an invasive form
of medical treatment. As it stands, the Life-Sustaining Procedures
Act fails to fulfill its basic purpose, i.e., to recognize "the dignity
which patients have a right to expect in making decisions concerning their own medical treatment."' 8 9 A "gutted" living will statute
is more dangerous in this respect than having no validating legislation at all. The existing legislation will discourage people from exCommission on Accreditation for Hospitals has been made applicable to Maryland hospitals by law. The Bill of Rights includes provisions mandating informed consent and
the right to refuse treatment. Id. at n.8.
187. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 353-55, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225-26 (1985).
Looking to cases in other states involving blood transfusions to Jehovah's Witnesses, the
Conroy court noted that when transfusions were authorized by courts, the patient's competency or the definiteness of the decision were at issue. Generally, patients are permitted to refuse medical treatment even at the risk of death, concluded the court. In the
case before it, the court had no doubt that Ms. Conroy would have chosen the withdrawal of the nasogastric tube. Id. See Bamberger, supra note 179, at 518-2 1.
188. Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, ch. 620, 1985 Md. Laws 2944, 2945 (codified at
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-605(1) (Supp. 1987)).
189. Id.
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pressing in writing their wishes about AN&H. As a result, they may
leave no evidence of their intent in this regard when they become
incompetent. Persons who do include provisions about AN&H in
their living wills do so without assurance that their effort to exercise
the right to forego this type of treatment will be honored. Perhaps
even more disturbing, prohibitions expressed in the Life-Sustaining
Procedures Act may cast shadows of supposed state intent extending far beyond the Act's true confines. Even competent patients to whom living will legislation does not apply may be force-

fed.
It also is unsatisfactory to piece together an alternate means of
terminating treatment from statutes originally designed for other
purposes. An overall statutory scheme pertaining to the right to
forego treatment should be adopted in Maryland. Like the existing
Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, it should validate the status of the
living will. But authoring a living will is just one means of exercising
the right to forego life-sustaining treatment. The new legislation
also should provide for a durable power of attorney specifically
designed for health care decisionmaking. The special durable
power of attorney should enable advance designation of health care
preferences in situations ranging from the routine to the life-threatening. In addition, guidelines for surrogate decisionmaking should
be delineated in the context of the administration of life-sustaining
treatment to enable family members and physicians to make treatment decisions for a patient who failed to author an advance
directive.' 9 0
The new legislation should contain a blanket provision including AN&H within the definition of life-sustaining procedures which
may be foregone. Nevertheless, provisions mandating continuation
of comfort care, including natural forms of food and water, should
remain. It is important that the legislature distinguish in this manner artificial and natural forms of nutrition and hydration. AN&H is
190. As the cases previously discussed indicate, most people do not author advance
directives. A recent survey of 803 people in Oregon indicated that although 82% of the
participants had heard of a living will, only 16% responded that they or a member of
their household possessed such a document. The Latest Word, 17 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
51 (Apr. 1987). Oregon has a natural death statute. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 97-050 to
-090 (1984 & Supp. 1987). A study of 500 nurses and 500 physicians revealed that only
20% possessed living wills or similar documents. Forty-eight percent responded that
they were interested in signing a living will but had not yet done so. Anderson, Walker,
Pierce & Mills, Living Wills, Do Nurses and Physicians Have Them?, AM.J. NURSING 271 (Mar.
1986). These surveys indicate that avenues other than the living will must be made
available if the majority of people are to be allowed to exercise their right to forego lifesustaining treatment.
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an invasive form of medical treatment which, like other medical
treatment, may be discontinued under certain circumstances; however, the assurance of natural forms of food and water to the sick
and dying remains a vital part of our humanity.
As an alternative to altering the definition of life-sustaining
treatment, the Maryland legislature may wish to consider provisions
similar to those recently enacted in Oklahoma presuming that
"every incompetent patient has directed his health care providers to
provide him with hydration and nutrition to a degree that is sufficient to sustain life."'' This presumption, however, could be overridden by clear and convincing evidence that the patient when
competent decided against such measures, when the measures
themselves will cause severe, intractable and long-lasting pain, when
the patient is irreversibly unconscious, or when death is imminent.' 9 2 Again, the Maryland legislature should distinguish AN&H
from other forms of food and water and ensure that only the former
may be foregone.
The legislature is the appropriate forum for decisions of this
nature.'9 3 As elected officials, state senators and delegates receive
constant feedback from the citizens they represent. The legislature
holds public hearings as forums for constituent opinion. Nevertheless, this process will continue to be thwarted when the position and
power of select interest groups allow them to control the system. In
the current political climate, it is unlikely that.any amendment allowing for the discontinuation of AN&H will meet with success.
This will remain true until the interest groups begin to accept the
new view of AN&H.
If the legislature fails to act, the determination of AN&H as a
form of medical treatment will be left to the judiciary. Maryland
courts someday will be asked to rule whether a patient's request to
have AN&H withheld or withdrawn will be honored despite the existing legislative provisions. This may occur when a Maryland resident who, interpreting the statutory language as ambiguous and
191. Hydration and Nutrition for Incompetent Patients Act, 1987 Okla. Sess. Laws
180, 181 (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 3080.1 to .5 (Supp. 1988)).
192. Id. at 182. This language differs slightly from the Oklahoma statute in that it
would include patients who are comatose or in a persistent vegetative state but whose
death is not necessarily imminent. Id.
193. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 225, 741 P.2d 674,. 692 (1987)
("Only the Legislature has the resources necessary to gather and synthesize the vast
quantities of information needed to formulate guidelines that will best accommodate the
rights and interests of the many individuals and institutions involved in these tragic
situations.").
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encouraged by decisions such as Corbett,'94 includes a supplementary provision in a living will specifically enumerating AN&H among
the forms of terminable treatment. The question may be posed in
the context of a nonresident who has written a living will under the
laws of a home state allowing the termination of AN&H.'9 5 The
court of special appeals' opinion in Mercy Hospital196 is promising in
this regard because it indicates that the court will continue to support the right to refuse treatment.
Determining the role Df the court in this context goes to the
heart of questions about judicial intervention. Perhaps a court
should not be required to make decisions which are more ethical
than legal in nature. Judicial proceedings may be drawn out and
costly. Often the patient dies before his or her rights are determined. If the legislature fails to clarify the status of AN&H, however, Maryland courts should not evade their responsibility of
affirming constitutional and common-law rights to forego nonconsensual forms of treatment. While it is true that exact factual patterns in cases involving the right to forego treatment never will be
duplicated, the fundamental issues they raise almost certainly
will.19 7 The difficulty of these issues is exactly what makes them so
important. Health care providers should be particularly anxious for
these issues to be resolved. Not only is there the fear of prosecution
for terminating treatment, but at least one court has found a possible cause of action for continuing treatment against the wishes of a
98
patient or the patient's family.'
The status of AN&H in natural death legislation has moved to
the foreground of right to die issues. This controversy did not suddenly spring from the minds of medical ethicists. It began when
decisions such as Barber and Conroy, based upon .new findings by
194. See supra notes 102-114 and accompanying text.

195. Living wills executed outside of Maryland by nonresidents are given effect in
Maryland only if they comply with the Life-Sustaining Procedures Act. MD. HEALTHGEN. CODE ANN. § 5-612(b) (Supp. 1987).
196. See supra notes 179-186 and accompanying text.
197. Several jurisdictions have made an exception to the mootness doctrine in cases

involving the removal of life support systems where the patient died during the pendency of litigation. See, e.g., Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 213-14, 741 P.2d at 680-81; Corbett,
487 So. 2d at 369; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 342, 486 A.2d at 1219. These courts recognize that

the issues underlying the particular proceedings do not perish with the patient; rather,
they are of significant public importance, capable of repetition yet evading review. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 342, 486 A.2d at 1219.
198. Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 395, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051-52
(1984) (ruling that, as a matter of law, the placing of a patient in a chronic vegetative
state on life support systems against her wishes created a cause of action for battery).
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medical authorities, included AN&H among other forms of medical
treatment. Interest groups such as the MCC reacted to these decisions by prompting legislatures to adopt new statutes or to amend
existing legislation in order to curtail the right to forego AN&H.
The most recent development in this progression is counteraction
by courts in those jurisdictions which attempt to limit the right by
statute. Courts are beginning to rule that natural death acts are not
the sole means of exercising the right to die, and that they do not
limit a court's ability to rule based upon common-law and constitutional rights.
. The dispute is far from resolved. As of this writing, no state has
reported a direct confrontation between the implementation of a living will requesting that AN&H be discontinued and a restrictive natural death act. When this confrontation occurs in Maryland, our
courts should recognize firmly that an individual's right to forego
treatment, including AN&H, remains paramount despite any legislative provision to the contrary.
WENDY ANN KRONMILLER*
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